Credit off-take from formal financial institutions in rural India: quantile regression results by Debdatta Pal & Arnab Kumar Laha
Pal and Laha Agricultural and Food Economics 2014, 2:9
http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/2/1/9RESEARCH Open AccessCredit off-take from formal financial institutions in
rural India: quantile regression results
Debdatta Pal1* and Arnab Kumar Laha2* Correspondence:
debdatta@iimraipur.ac.in
1Economics and Business
Environment, Indian Institute of
Management Raipur, GEC Campus,
Raipur 352015, India
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article©
A
mAbstract: Extending financial services to unbanked population in India has remained
a central part of the policy thrust of the Indian government for decades. To that
effect, a widespread formal credit delivery mechanism has been established to meet
the credit requirements of rural communities. However, the Indian government-
backed formal financial sector has had limited success in providing resources to poor
rural households, which has led to strong criticism of the policy and its implementation.
In this study, we use data from 600 rural households spread across six Indian states to
examine the changing distribution of credit off-take among borrowers of formal
financial institutions. By using quantile regression, we find that even among rural
households that could access loans from the formal banking sector, the distribution of
credit off-take is skewed towards resource-rich households. We also find that even
among borrowers in the upper quantiles of the conditional loan distribution, marginal
farmers received substantially less loan amounts than those belonging to the category
of medium and large farmers.
JEL classifications: C31, Q14
Keywords: Rural credit; Formal finance; Quantile regression; IndiaBackground
The policy thrust to make formal credit inclusive has been a central focus of the Indian
government. This may be attributed to two widely accepted facts. First, access to credit is
a precursor for growth, and second, alternative credit sources are costly. Policy-makers in
India have long pushed the formal financial sector to open more outlets and bankers to
offer credit below the market clearing price (Burgess and Pande 2005). However, since
credit is an inter-temporal contract, lenders face the dual problem of adverse selection
(hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action). If lenders, through screening,
cannot identify borrowers based on their likelihood of default, willful default may rise. In
response to this, informal lenders may add a default premium on top of the nominal
interest rate, an option that is unavailable to formal financial sources, where interest rates
are controlled by the government (Gonzalez-Vega 1984). Hence, formal lenders, namely
banks and cooperatives, may ration credit, request additional documents from and fre-
quent visits by the borrower (leading to higher borrower-side transaction costs), demand
marketable collateral, and favor production credit over consumption loan. The void cre-
ated out of the unmet credit demand from formal financial sources has led to the wide-
spread dependence of Indian rural households on informal credit sources, namely
moneylenders and traders (see Basu 2006 for empirical evidence).2014 Pal and Laha; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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the formal financial sector in agrarian economies can be classified under three broad
groups: first, those that attempt to identify factors affecting the choice of credit sectors
in rural economies (see, for example, Kochar 1997; Pal 2002; Sahu et al. 2004;
Boucher and Guirkinger 2007; Datta and Ghosh, 2013; Pal and Laha 2013), second,
those that explore the determinants of credit amounts received by rural households
from the formal sector (see, for example, Datta 2003; Sahu et al. 2004) and third,
those that estimate the effects of the lack of access to formal-sector credit on agricul-
tural production (Carter 1989; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008). The first two groups of
empirical investigations indicate that a large agricultural land size, good land quality,
the presence of irrigation and regarding the loan applicant, membership in a higher
caste and higher levels of educational attainment increase the applicant’s chance of
gaining access to formal credit sources as well as the quantum of credit disbursed by
the formal sector. The third set consists of a growing body of empirical literature that
suggest that credit constraints adversely affect farm production, farm profit, and farm
investment.
This study contributes additional empirical evidence to support the findings of the
second set of inquiries and attempts to answer the following question: among the rural
households that have received loans from the formal sector, what is the changing distri-
bution of credit off-take? Finding an answer to this question is pertinent from the fol-
lowing policy perspectives. First, it would help central bankers as well as policy makers
understand variations in outreach of the formal banking sector within its own client
group. Secondly, it would elucidate the extent of the gap between the credit off-take
from the formal financial sector by the rich and poor households in the context of a de-
veloping country like India. Moreover, apart from including those variables mentioned
in earlier studies, namely Datta (2003) and Sahu et al. (2004), this study also attempts
to capture the effects of village-level attributes, such as the distance of households from
commercial, financial, and educational institutions, on the loan amount.
These findings would complement the theoretical model advanced by Nakamura and
Nakajima (2011) which shows that improvements in the credit market during the early
stages of economic development is essential to escape poverty.
We used quantile regression, which was introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978),
to address this issue of improving the credit off-take from formal financial sources in
rural India. Quantile regression is used when conditional quantile functions and even
extremes are of interest, and it has been used in various areas of applied economics,
such as health economics (see Winkelmann 2006, for example), financial economics
(see Bassett and Chen 2001, for example), labor economics (see Buchinsky 1998, for a
detailed survey), and education economics (see Eide and Showalter 1998). To the best
of our knowledge, quantile regression has not been employed thus far to study changes
in the distribution of credit off-take by rural households. Consistent with the theory of
credit rationing, we observed that between resource-rich and resource-poor rural
households, there is considerable variation in the quantum of loan off-take from formal
financial institutions. By using quantile regression, we found that among borrowers in
the 90th quantile of the conditional loan distribution, marginal farmersa received only
approximately 80 percent of the loan amount of their counterparts belonging to the
category of medium and large farmers.
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describe the survey and dataset. Method presents the methodology used for analysis.
Results and discussion contains the results and discussion, and in Conclusions, we
indicate the policy implications.Survey and data description
The survey was conducted between May and December 2010 as part of the research
project of the Centre for Management in Agriculture, Indian Institute of Management
Ahmedabad, titled “Assessing Policy Interventions in Agri-Business and Allied Sector
Credit versus Credit Plus Approach for Livelihood Promotion,” sponsored by the Ministry
of Agriculture, Government of India. Six Indian states—Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, West
Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat—were selected based on two state-level
indicator criteria: first, the average population per branch of formal financial institution as
of the end of June 2009, and second, incidences of indebtedness of rural households. Table 1
shows these two indicators against the national average.
Against the national average of 6554 people per rural branch of formal financial insti-
tution attempt has been made to choose states with even spread on this criterion.
While a bank branch caters to 10410 people on average in Chhattisgarh, the number of
people served by a bank branch in Maharashtra is as low as 2688. The average popula-
tion per bank branch in West Bengal is the closest to national average. Therefore, vari-
ation on the level of branch penetration is well maintained in the sample. Similarly, the
sample states are distributed evenly above, below, and at the average for the criterion
of incidences of indebtedness of rural households. Through this process, we attempted
to capture variations among the sample states. To ensure that various lending institu-
tions are represented, we selected a village or cluster of villages within a single agro-
climatic region of a state where all credit sources, namely, formal, semi-formal, and
informal, are present (see Additional file 1: Appendix 1). Formal lending institutions are
scheduled public or private sector commercial banksc (SCB), regional rural banksd (RRB),
and cooperative banks,e namely, primary agricultural cooperative societies (PACS), multi-
purpose PACS (MPACS), District Central Cooperative Bank (DCCB), and State Coopera-
tive Banks. Semi-formal credit sources include self-help groupsf (SHG) and microfinance
institutionsg (MFI). The informal sector includes moneylenders, input dealers, output
traders, shopkeepers, and friends and relatives. A complete enumeration of allTable 1 Indicators of branch penetration and rural indebtedness
State Average population per rural
financial institution branch
as of March 2009#
Incidence of indebtedness of rural households
(in %) as of June 2002$
Institutional Non-institutional All
Chhattisgarh 10410 14.4 6.7 19.8
Maharashtra 2688 22.8 7.2 27.5
West Bengal 6095 12.1 11.0 21.8
Andhra Pradesh 11784 14.9 32.9 42.3
Tamil Nadu 5976 13.9 21.3 31.3
Gujarat 3759 14.7 15.8 28.1
All of India 6554 13.4 15.5 26.5
#Authors' own calculationb.
$Household indebtedness in India as of 06.30.02 (National Sample Survey Organisation 2005).
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a representative sample of village households.
The survey was conducted in five villages in West Bengal, three villages each in
Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh, and one village each in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and
Tamil Nadu. From each village in West Bengal, 30 households were chosen through
random sampling, whereas in the other states, 50 households were randomly chosen
from each village. Thus, the total sample size in this study consists of 600 households.
Each sample household was administered a structured questionnaire to collect general
information on household demographics, social characteristics, occupation (both pri-
mary and secondary), resource endowment, loan-related information (i.e., access to
different credit sources between April 2009 and March 2010), and the terms and condi-
tions of the loan facilities experienced by the borrowers.
Incidentally, besides respondents that borrowed from mutually exclusive sources (i.e.,
formal, semi-formal, or informal), this survey also included those that borrowed from
multiple sources. Of the 600 sampled households, 231 met their full credit demand en-
tirely from formal sources, 129 met part of their credit demand from formal sources,
91 respondents were excluded from formal sources but have used credit facilities from
semi-formal and/or informal sources, 71 were dependent solely on informal credit
sources, and 75 respondents did not avail any credit facilities during the corresponding
period (see Table 2).
Of the 600 households, 525 availed themselves of at least one credit facility during
April 2009 to March 2010. Out of these 525 borrower households, 293 households have
used only one loan during this period. During the corresponding period, the numbers
of households with two, three, and four loans are 140, 53, and 39, respectively. There-
fore, the total number of loan cases gathered from this survey is 888 (see Table 3).
Of the 888 loan cases considered, 399 loans were offered by formal credit sources,
109 loans by semi-formal sources, and the remaining 370 loans by the informal sector.
We followed the coding pattern suggested by Walter et al. (1987), which is given in
Additional file 2: Appendix 2. To elucidate the characteristics of the villages and house-
holds covered in this study, we report summary statistics in Table 4.Method
The analysis is based on 399 loan contracts extended by the formal financial sector
among the 600 sample households. Earlier analyses (see, Datta 2003; Sahu et al. 2004)Table 2 Categories of households based on loan sources
Source of loan Category of household
Formal Semi-formal Informal
Yes No No Households met their full credit demand entirely from the formal sector
Yes Yes No Households met part of their credit demand from the formal sector
Yes No Yes
Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Households excluded from the formal sector but which used credit
facilities from semi-formal and/or informal sectors
No Yes Yes
No No Yes Households solely dependent on the informal sector
No No No Households without any credit facilities
Table 3 Distribution of loans across households
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squares (OLS) regression methods. However, these OLS estimates of the various effects
on the conditional mean of the loan amount, E(Y | covariates), may not truly represent
the nature and size of those effects on the lower tail of the loan amount distribution.
Here, we deviate from the earlier approach and use quantile regression (see, Koenker
and Bassett 1978; Koenker 2005), which models the dependence of the conditional
quantiles of Y given the covariates. This is helpful in models wherein extremes are vital.
Here, quantile regression is expected to yield a comprehensive picture of the condi-
tional distribution of loan off-take from formal creditors by rural customers given dif-
ferent village, household, and loan attributes for both the lower and upper quantiles.
Let (yi, xi), i = 1,…,n, be a sample from a population, where xi is a (K × 1) vector of re-
gressors. Assuming that the τth quantile of the conditional distribution of yi is linear in xi,
let us denote ξ xi; βτð Þ as the τth quantile of the distribution of yi |xi. That is,
ξ xi; βτð Þ≡ inf y : Fi y xÞ≥τjð½
Then, we assume that ξ xi; βð Þ ¼ x0β , where, βτ is the unknown vector of parametersτ i τ
to be estimated for varying values of τ where 0 < τ < 1. By changing the value of τ, the









where ρτ(u) denotes the function defined as
ρτ uð Þ ¼
τu if u ≥ 0
τ−1ð Þu if u < 0
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10, which results in the 10
th quantile, median, and 90th quantile, respect-
ively. Here, yi is the amount of loan received by the sampled rural households from for-
mal credit sources during 2009-10, and xi is a vector of independent variables
describing the village, household, and loan characteristics.
Results and discussion
As an outcome of the exchange mechanism, a credit transaction is governed not only
by the demand for credit but also by the lender’s willingness to extend credit. Further-
more, being an inter-temporal transaction, credit exposes the lender to post-
contractual default risks. Therefore, the lender would take utmost care to ensure timely
repayment of his or her dues. Hence, it is likely that the formal lender will consider a
Table 4 Summary statistics of exogenous variables used in the empirical analysis
A
Variable Definition of variable Mean Minimum Maximum n
PIRRI Percentage of agricultural land under
assured irrigation in a particular village
58.60 0 100 14
PELECTRIC Percentage of households having access to
electricity in a particular village
72.73 3 98 14
AGRI Average distance (in km) from agricultural
infrastructures (e.g., Agriculture Produce
Marketing Committee sub-yard, office of
extension service providers, agricultural
input retailers, and farm machinery dealers)
5.15 0.83 10.33 14
EDU Average distance (in km) from educational
institutions
2.23 0 6.5 14
FININS Average distance (in km) from formal
financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks
and cooperatives)
3.76 0 8.33 14
FAMTOT Number of key social leaders (e.g., Panchayat
Pradhani, government extension officers,
local school head masters, and financial
institution officials) whom the household
is familiar with
3.95 0 7 600
LOANAMT Amount (in Indian Rupee - INRj) of loan
made available
20656.19 200 600000 888
TCOST Borrower’s total transaction cost in INR 246.89 0 2960 888
RAINT Annualized interest rate in reducing balance 18.47 0 61 888
B
Variable Definition of variable Frequency Cumulative
1 0
CASTRDUM Caste and religion:1 = Upper caste Hindu,
0 = Otherwise (Lower caste Hindu and
minorities, such as Muslims)
186 (31.00) 414 (69.00) 600 (100)
LANDD1 Household is minimum from marginal
farmer category (Yes = 1, No = 0)
536 (89.33) 64 (10.67) 600 (100)
LANDD2 Household is minimum from small farmer
category (Yes = 1, No = 0)
199 (33.17) 401 (66.83) 600 (100)
LANDD3 Household is minimum from medium/large
farmer category (Yes = 1, No = 0)
69 (11.50) 531 (88.50) 600 (100)
IRRISTATD1 At least a part of the agricultural land of the
household has assured irrigation
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
343 (57.17) 257 (42.83) 600 (100)
IRRISTATD2 Agricultural land of the household is
covered under assured irrigation
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
188 (31.33) 412 (68.67) 600 (100)
ALACDUM Household engaged in allied activity as
fisheries/orchard/farm forestry
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
93 (15.50) 507 (84.50) 600 (100)
DWELLD1 Household possesses at least a mud built
house (Yes = 1, No = 0)
580 (96.67) 20 (3.33) 600 (100)
DWELLD2 Household possesses at least a mud and
brick built house (Yes = 1, No = 0)
285 (47.50) 315 (52.50) 600 (100)
DWELLD3 Household possesses a brick built house
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
74 (12.33) 426 (87.67) 600 (100)
SANITD1 Household having at least an open toilet
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
438 (73.00) 162 (27.00) 600 (100)
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Table 4 Summary statistics of exogenous variables used in the empirical analysis
(Continued)
SANITD2 Household with modern toilet facility
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
271 (45.17) 329 (54.83) 600 (100)
PURPDUM Loan is for production purpose
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
525 (59.12) 363 (40.88) 888 (100)
SECDUM Loan is secured by marketable collateral
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
294 (33.11) 594 (66.89) 888 (100)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
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plicant, the quantum of loan requirement would also be dependent on various factors.
Below, we describe these factors and their relationship to the chance of loan approval
by a formal lender as well as to the quantum of loan requirement.Factors affecting the supply of credit
Since credit is extended to agricultural households who borrow on the basis of their
land holding, such land holding acts as collateral from the lender’s perspective. The
lender is assured that borrowers with a larger acreage of land would produce sufficient
output to generate income to repay loans without difficulty. An assured irrigation facil-
ity increases the reliability of higher crop production and is, in turn, associated with a
higher profit potential of the farmer applicant. This would be perceived positively by
the lender and would carry a higher probability that loan applications for higher
amounts will be considered favorably by the formal lender. Lenders may also prefer
households that engage in allied activities such as cattle rearing and fishery, which are
alternative earning sources to farming, as such activities may lower the probability of
default in the event of crop failure. Access to information from extension agents is ex-
pected to help farmers adopt improved farming technology, thereby increasing the
probability of higher yields. Lenders may prefer farmers with a possibility of registering
more income from higher yields.
The possession of landed house property as well as in-house toilet facilities would
signal a resource-rich household in rural India, thereby increasing the household’s
chance of receiving a higher amount in loans from the formal lender. Familiarity with
key social leaders is expected to improve the credentials of the loan applicant and,
hence, may be considered favorably by the formal lender. Since large tracks of land are
traditionally owned by resource-rich upper caste Hindu families in India, belonging to
such a family may also create a favorable impression on the lender.
Indeed, banks may prefer households from villages with a higher coverage of assured
irrigation and access to electrical power, as farmers from those villages are expected to
undertake multiple-cropping and thus carry better profit potential as compared to
households that do not have access to such public infrastructure support. Villages
closer to agricultural infrastructure carry higher business potential and, thus, may be
favored by formal lenders. Furthermore, proximity to formal financial institutions is ex-
pected to lead to a wider outreach of financial services as a result of minimum transac-
tion costs incurred by the lender to service those clients. Banks may also prefer to lend
in villages closer to educational institutions, as those villages would have a higher
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better employability in non-farm sectors and, hence, have sufficient income to repay
loans.
Lastly, formal creditors would prefer to lend for the purpose of production over that
of consumption, since the former is associated with the possibility of generating posi-
tive surplus required to meet debt obligations.
Factors affecting the demand for credit
A large track of land with a good irrigation facility not only extends a positive signal to
the formal lender but it also boosts the demand for credit to meet higher production
expenses incurred from the purchase of improved varieties of seeds and other inputs,
wage payments to laborers, the rental of agricultural machinery such as tractors, and
electricity charges. Moreover, households with allied activities such as cattle rearing
and fishery could assume a higher debt exposure, as income from alternative sources
would act as a contingency for avoiding any default risks in the event of production
failure. Households with access to information from extension agents are expected
to adopt improved farming technology, thus, they may require a higher quantum
of loan to meet higher production costs. Furthermore, upper caste Hindu families
with large land holdings may demand higher loan amounts to meet higher costs
of cultivation.
Peasant households belonging to villages with access to assured irrigation and elec-
trical power are expected to undertake multiple-cropping and thus require a higher
amount in loans compared to villagers farming under rain-fed mono-cropping systems.
Villages closer to agricultural infrastructures are expected to carry a higher business
potential and are therefore more likely to borrow money for expanding agricultural or
other business activities. In addition, agricultural households from villages located near
formal financial institutions are expected to perform more transactions and avail them-
selves of a higher quantum of loans due to the minimum transaction costs involved in
dealing with formal lenders. Similarly, villages located near educational institutions are
expected to have a higher number of educated households that are more informed
about the lending process of formal financial institutions and thus have a better scope
of obtaining higher loan amounts from the formal sector.
Households may apply for loans for agricultural production or other purposes,
namely consumption purpose. Such loans may or may not be backed by marketable
collateral. These, as well as the total ex ante monetary costs involved in negotiating the
loan and annual interest rates, represent loan attributes that may affect both access to
credit from the formal lender and the quantum of loan.
The variable definitions given in Table 4 include all of the variables mentioned above.
Initially, we outlined the effects of these variables on the loan amount, by using OLS.
Next, three quantile regression models, for the 10th quantile, 50th quantile, and 90th quan-
tile, were fitted with the loan amount as the dependent variable and the various village,
household, and loan attributes as explanatory variables. The model parameters were esti-
mated using the PROCREG and QUANTREG procedures of the SAS software.
State-level variations in both OLS and quantile regression were captured by state
dummies. Although data were collected from 3-5 villages for Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra,
and West Bengal, these villages are from a single cluster of an agro-climatic region.
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across villages.Results of OLS regression analysis
The results of the OLS estimates are presented in Table 5. As expected, the presence of
irrigation facilities and electrical power in a borrower’s village positively boosted the
credit off-take from formal financial institutions in that village. Close proximity of the
borrower’s village to formal financial institutions positively affected the loan amount, as
expected. However, close proximity of the borrower’s village to agricultural marketsTable 5 Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the linear regression model for loan
amount




Chhattisgarh (CGARH) −32785* 16763.00
Maharashtra (MAHA) −44746*** 15840.00
West Bengal (WB) −34541 23433.00
Andhra Pradesh (AP) −81708*** 20033.00
























Number of observations 399
***Significant at a level of 1 percent; **significant at a level of 5 percent; *significant at a level of 10 percent significance.
1Gujarat (GUJ) state was used as the base state in this analysis.
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rowing from the formal sector.
Unsurprisingly, farm households with a minimum of two hectares of land were
found to be favored by formal lenders. Assured irrigation facilities do have a posi-
tive effect on the approval of loans from formal lenders. Moreover, households with
additional income from allied activities were able to borrow greater amounts in
loans from formal lenders. Familiarity with key social leaders, as expected, may have
established a borrower’s credentials on a strong footing for the formal lenders,
therefore, these households could obtain higher amounts in loans from banks. Agri-
cultural households belonging to the upper caste Hindu community, which trad-
itionally controlled better production resources, attracted big ticket loans, as
expected. In addition, formal lenders met the higher credit demands of households
who asked for production loans and who offered marketable security to obtain such
loans.
The above analysis is based on OLS regression analysis, which estimates the average
loan amount from the financial sector, conditional on the covariates.
Results of quantile regression analysis
The next model, which concerns the estimates of loan amounts across quantiles, is pre-
sented in Table 6. As quantile regression analysis estimates the total loan amount in
various conditional quantiles, we can develop more detailed and accurate information
from different borrower groups, depending on the loan amount. We estimated three
separate quantile levels, 10 percent, 50 percent, and 90 percent.
Here, we compared the results of the OLS regression with that of the quantile
regression at three levels (i.e., 10th quantile, 50th quantile, and 90th quantile). We
also checked whether the direction of the explanatory variables changed over quan-
tiles and tried to interpret possible reasons for such variations across the borrower
groups.
The extent of coverage of irrigation facilities in the sample villages was observed
to have positively boosted the credit off-take from formal financial institutions across
all quantiles, a result that is similar to the one in the OLS estimate. The extent of
electrical power coverage, as expected, was found to have a positive and significant
effect on loan amounts in both the 50th and 90th quantiles, which is in line with the
OLS regression results. However, this independent variable was observed to have a
negative effect on loan amounts in the 10th quantile. As one of the major uses of
electricity in an agrarian economy is to supply power for mechanized water extrac-
tion, it seems plausible as households with loan amounts in the 10th quantile (i.e.,
with smaller loan amounts) may have used the groundwater-based irrigation facilities
of affluent larger farmers on a payment basis, rather than possessing their own
pumps.
Close proximity to agricultural infrastructures such as markets, contrary to expect-
ation, was observed to affect the loan amount across the three quantiles negatively.
The same variable was also shown to carry a negative effect on the loan amount in
the OLS regression. This may be a result of a common practice in Indian villages,
wherein traders pick up produce from farm gates. While the farmers save transac-
tion costs in the form of transportation and wage loss, traders benefit from scale
Table 6 Estimated Quantile Regression models for different quantiles of loan amount
Explanatory variables Parameter estimates
10th quantile 50th quantile 90th quantile
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Intercept −3023.04 6145.14 −58343.10*** 14224.51 −147202*** 48695.88
State dummy1
CGARH −129.87 2022.37 −19829.60*** 5339.15 −125685*** 20686.72
MAHA 4978.60** 2350.93 −13951.00** 5607.84 −119181*** 20987.51
WB −3981.68 3444.37 −26902.60*** 7848.67 −136140*** 30152.03
AP −934.78 4145.60 −41410.40*** 6103.54 −146031** 66209.14
TN 8821.28* 4719.19 −29652.00*** 7069.57 −185739*** 29719.60
Village attribute
PIRRI 79.70 52.57 277.56*** 92.58 840.77** 357.02
PELECTRIC −20.76 44.68 277.56*** 97.64 939.31** 367.13
AGRI 804.46 761.64 2684.61** 1170.26 6420.22 4443.15
EDU −264.58 664.07 2902.40*** 987.40 8018.66 5027.19
FININS −919.00 649.98 −2713.70*** 999.26 −11031*** 4025.82
Household attribute
LANDD1 123.54 2446.33 −8176.26** 3462.95 −1756.14 14581.15
LANDD2 838.44 1159.54 5606.88*** 1656.78 9743.56 6883.54
LANDD3 2439.05 1711.23 5507.91** 2679.73 47032.80*** 16963.92
IRRISTATD1 −500.14 1332.19 5328.91** 2351.58 6506.94 8388.00
ALACDUM 52.82 1476.04 4681.41* 2605.45 29196.12** 12611.03
INFORDUM −631.00 1218.70 −4227.71** 1983.89 −14808.40** 7058.17
DWELLD2 17.16 1134.54 −2243.86 1578.45 −13336.90* 8157.36
SANITD1 341.14 1112.72 5740.65*** 1616.22 19080.75*** 7270.81
FAMTOT 100.91 270.96 2048.82*** 610.63 4138.44* 2414.25
CASTRDUM 911.02 1180.00 4869.94** 2062.23 18121.14** 9362.52
Loan attribute
PURPDUM −3536.50*** 1348.02 7996.44*** 2967.14 58381.59*** 12673.53
SECDUM 380.90 955.75 5133.02*** 1752.80 20225.97*** 6662.52
TCOST 9.23 2.52 21.26*** 4.22 64.07*** 20.64
RAINT 656.33 217.79 2804.72*** 450.08 9272.05*** 1929.91
Wald test 13.4542 25.4063 9.6373
Likelihood ratio χ2 (16) 32.6728 59.4395 72.8337
Number of observations 399 399 399
***Significant at a level of 1 percent; **significant at a level of 5 percent; *significant at a level of 10 percent significance.
1Gujarat (GUJ) state was used as the base state in analysis.
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an assured supply of produce. Thus, even being far away from agricultural infra-
structures such as markets, farmers would enjoy favor from formal lenders. Close
proximity to formal financial institutions, as expected, boosted the loan off-take
from the formal sector across quantiles and was significant at both the 50 percent
and 90 percent levels. This regressor also had a similar effect on the regressand in
the OLS regression.
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fect on loan amounts, which is in line with the OLS estimation results. While at the
median level, households with a minimum of one hectare of land became significant,
at the 90th quantile level, land holdings of a minimum of two hectares were shown
to be significant. This clearly indicates that borrower households with larger oper-
ational land holdings are given larger loans from formal creditors. Availability of as-
sured irrigation had a negative though insignificant effect on the loan amount in the
lower quantile but a positive and significant effect at the median level. This may be
explained by the possibility that households with lesser loan amounts are also mar-
ginal or tenant farmers who engage in cultivation during rainy seasons only. Because
of the costly nature of crop cultivation during the winter season, such farmers may
not be involved in winter crop production, which is dependent primarily on irriga-
tion, and they may be working as wage laborers in the fields of large farmers. Un-
surprisingly, alternative income from allied activities boosted the loan off-take from
formal financial institutions, a result that is observed both in the OLS and across
quantiles. Familiarity with key social leaders was also found to have a positive effect
on the loan amount in all three quantiles, as expected. Belonging to the upper-caste
Hindu community had a positive effect on the loan amount in all three quantiles
but gained statistical significance in the 50th and 90th quantiles only. Both variables
also showed a positive and significant effect on formal sector loans in the OLS
framework.
Borrowing for production purposes was found to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on loan amounts in the OLS and under quantile regression at the
50 percent and 90 percent levels. Interestingly, this variable showed a negative and
significant effect on the loan amount in the 10th quantile. This may be attributed to
the provision of a small quantum of loans from the formal sector for consumption
purposes, which is non-productive in nature. It is worth noting that formal credit
sources resort primarily to project-based lending, where there is visible cash flow
and adequate surplus to meet debt obligations. The formal sector’s appetite for
collateral-backed finance was reflected in both the OLS and quantile regression, as
availability of collateral was shown to have a positive and significant effect on the
loan amount.
We also found that larger loan sizes were positively and significantly associated with
higher transaction costs, which means that borrowers may need to incur considerable
expenses in frequent visits to bank branches to obtain credit facilities. Furthermore,
higher interest rates were found to have a positive and significant effect on loan size.
This may be due to prevailing interest rate regulations where, within an interest cap,
banks charge more on higher credit limits. These trends were observed in both the
OLS and quantile regression (for the 50th and 90th quantiles). Both variables have a
positive (though statistically insignificant) effect on loan amounts at the 10 percent
level under quantile regression.
The coefficients of the explanatory variables across the 10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles
in the quantile regression are listed in Table 6, which indicates the variations in loan
off-take from formal credit sources across borrower categories (i.e., marginal farmer,
small farmer, and medium and large farmers. Because of the ordinal nature of this vari-
able, the category of landless farmer was included as the reference category. We discuss
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unfavorable.
Suppose agricultural household type A, which has more than two hectares of land,
hails from a relatively prosperous village in Chhattisgarh state. In this village, 90 per-
cent of the agricultural land has access to assured irrigation and the same percentage
of households have access to electrical power. The village is located near critical infra-
structures, such as agricultural input and output markets, educational institutions, and
financial institutions, with the average distance between the village and these facilities
being 4 km, 2 km, and 2 km, respectively. Household type A belongs to the upper caste
Hindu community, enjoys assured irrigation for its agricultural land, is engaged in
allied activity, possesses a brick house, and has in-house toilet facilities. The house-
hold is familiar with four key social leaders and receives information on agricultural
activity from extension agents. It can receive a loan for agricultural production at an
annual interest rate of 4 percent. For negotiating this loan contract, this household
must incur an ex ante transaction cost of INR 300, and because of the household’s
higher profit potential, it could receive this loan facility without offering any market-
able collateral.
In contrast, suppose agricultural household type B, which has less than one hectare
of land, hails from a backward village in Chhattisgarh state. In this village, only 50 per-
cent of the agricultural land has assured irrigation, and an equal percentage of house-
holds have electrical power. The village is located far from critical infrastructures such
as agricultural input and output markets, educational institutions, and formal financial
institutions, with the average distance between the village and these facilities being
10 km, 6 km, and 8 km, respectively. Household type B belongs to either a lower caste
Hindu or minority community, has only a part of its land under irrigation, is not in-
volved in allied activities, and lives in a mud house without in-house toilet facilities.
The household is familiar with only two key social leaders and does not receive any in-
formation about production activity from extension agents. It can receive a loan for
production facility at an annual interest rate of 10 percent. To access this loan facility,
household type B has to bear an ex ante transaction cost of INR 500, and because of its
poor profit potential, the household must arrange marketable collateral to receive the
loan from the formal sector.
Table 7 shows six cases in each state, along with their corresponding 10th quantile,
50th quantile, and 90th quantile of the conditional distribution of the loan amount.
These six cases comprise both the favorable and unfavorable conditions described
above across the categories of marginal, small, and medium and large farmers. Thus,
there are a total of 30 cases across the five states.
In Table 7, we see from Case 1 that the middle 80 percent of type B households have
a loan off-take between INR 7089 and INR 75653, with a median off-take of INR
30934. From Case 6, we observe that in contrast to type B households, 80 percent of
type A households have a loan off-take between INR 7894 and INR 130012, with a me-
dian off-take of INR 36351. We see that there is considerable variation in the amount
of loan off-take among both types of households, with the variation being larger for
type A households. Being resource rich, type A households are able to negotiate a
higher amount in loans. This stands to be 17.5 percent if we compare the median
off-take for both types of households. This is troubling from a state-policy
Table 7 Loan amount across quantiles under varying situations
Case no. State PIRRI AGRI EDU FININS PELECTRIC LANDD1 LANDD2 LANDD3 IRRISTATD1 ALACDUM INFORDUM
1 CGARH 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
2 CGARH 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
3 CGARH 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
4 CGARH 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 CGARH 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
6 CGARH 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 MAHA 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
8 MAHA 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
9 MAHA 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
10 MAHA 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
11 MAHA 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
12 MAHA 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
13 WB 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
14 WB 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
15 WB 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
16 WB 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
17 WB 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
18 WB 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
19 AP 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
20 AP 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
21 AP 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
22 AP 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes


















Table 7 Loan amount across quantiles un r varying situations (Continued)
24 AP 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
25 GUJ 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
26 GUJ 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
27 GUJ 50 10 6 8 50 Yes Yes No No
28 GUJ 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes
29 GUJ 90 4 2 2 90 Yes Yes Yes Yes


















Table 7 Loan amount across quantiles under varying situations (Continued)
Case no. DWELLD2 SANITD1 FAMTOT CASTRDUM PURPDUM SECDUM TCOST RAINT LOAN AMT
10% 50% 90%
1 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 7089 30934 75653
2 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 7804 44717 87152
3 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 9405 44618 124442
4 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 5579 22667 81223
5 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 6294 36450 92723
6 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 7894 36351 130012
7 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 12198 36813 82157
8 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 12913 50596 93656
9 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 14513 50497 130946
10 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 10687 28546 87727
11 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 11402 42329 99227
12 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 13003 42230 136516
13 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 3238 23861 65198
14 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 3952 37644 76697
15 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 5553 37545 113987
16 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 1727 15594 70768
17 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 2442 29377 82268
18 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 4042 29278 119557
19 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 6284 9353 55307
20 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 6999 23136 66806
21 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 8600 23037 104096
22 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 4774 1086 60877


















Table 7 Loan amount across quantiles under varying situations (Continued)
24 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 7089 14770 109666
25 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 7272 55445 230534
26 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 7987 69228 242034
27 No Yes 2 No Yes Yes 500 10 9588 69129 279323
28 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 5709 42497 206908
29 Yes Yes 4 Yes Yes No 300 4 6423 56280 218408
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http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/2/1/9perspective, since the financial inclusion policy set by the government of India aims
to ensure adequate and affordable credit flow even to resource-poor households. We
see from this comparison that the loan off-take is skewed towards resource-rich
households, whereas it should ideally be in the other direction. Table 7 also shows
that even among borrowers in the 90th quantile of the conditional loan distribution,
marginal farmers received only approximately 80 percent of the loan amount of their
counterparts who belong to the category of medium and large farmers (compare case
25 with case 27).Conclusions
This study was motivated by the growing debate concerning the large-scale exclusion
of rural households from the ambit of formal credit delivery channels, despite the con-
tinuous thrust of the state towards inclusive growth. Unlike studies that cover only lim-
ited geographical areas, this study includes six Indian states with varying institutional
settings.
Several conclusions related to policy can be drawn from this analysis. First, the formal
credit market in rural areas is sensitive to the characteristics of the village and the ap-
plicant’s household and production. Second, there is considerable variation in the
quantum of loans received from formal creditors. Third, even among borrowers in the
90th quantile of the conditional loan distribution, marginal farmers received only ap-
proximately 80 percent of the loan amount of their counterparts belonging to the cat-
egory of medium and large farmers. In other words, even where poor clients managed
to access formal-sector creditors, the quantum of credit off-take is lower than that of
their resource-rich counterparts. Therefore, despite government pushes for financial in-
clusion, the distribution of credit from the formal financial sector remains skewed to-
wards resource-rich rural households.Endnotes
aHouseholds with operational land holdings of up to 1 hectare, above 1 hectare and
up to 2 hectare, above 2 hectare and up to 4 hectare, and more than 4 hectare are
termed marginal, small, medium, and large farmer, respectively. Though medium
farmer and large farmer are separate categories in government documents, we have
placed them together in this study as medium and large farmers (i.e., households with
operational landholdings of more than 2 hectares).
bMid-year rural population (source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy) divided
by the total number of a commercial bank’s rural branches (source: Quarterly Statistics
on Deposits and Credit of Scheduled Commercial Banks, Reserve Bank of India) and
cooperative societies (source: Trend and Progress of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of
India).
cScheduled commercial banks (SCB) comprise those banks that are registered under
the second schedule of India’s central bank (i.e., Reserve Bank of India’s Act, 1934).
They include both public and privately owned banks. Their operation is mostly spread
over multiple districts and even across states.
dRegional Rural Banks (RRBs) came into existence in 1975, with their primary
goal being to cater to rural clients. The operation of RRBs is limited to few
Pal and Laha Agricultural and Food Economics 2014, 2:9 Page 19 of 20
http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/2/1/9districts. RRBs are jointly owned by the Government of India, the respective State
Government, and the sponsor bank, which is either an SCB or State Cooperative
Bank.
eCooperative banks are financial institutions wherein the customers are the owners.
Primary agricultural cooperative societies (PACS) are localized units owned by local
people who share a common interest and who are involved in deposit mobilization and
lending activities. In cases where cooperatives are also engaged in non-financial activ-
ities such as the selling of agricultural input, the running of consumer stores, and the
trading of agricultural output, these banks are known as Multi-purpose Cooperative So-
cieties (MPACS).
fSelf Help Group (SHG) is a group of approximately 20 financially challenged
people who belong to a common socioeconomic strata that have come together
initially to save money and to use the corpus for lending among themselves.
After a certain time period of savings, SHGs may approach the bank for a loan.
This process obviates the need for marketable collateral, which banks usually
ask to secure repayment, by instituting peer pressure and a group guarantee
mechanism.
gMicrofinance Institutions (MFI) form groups of poor people and act as lenders to
the groups after sourcing loan from other financial institutions such as commercial
banks.
hIf a village is too large in terms of the number of households, some representa-
tive hamlets of that village (not exceeding 300 households) were used for complete
enumeration. In such cases, only those households covered under complete enumer-
ation constitute the population from which the sample was drawn.
iThe elected head of a local village-level governance structure.
jDuring 2009-10: US$1 = Indian Rupee (INR) 47.Additional files
Additional file 1: Appendix 1. Distribution of lenders across sample villages in certain states in India.
Additional file 2: Appendix 2. Coding of ordered exogenous variables.
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